U.S. Department of Education

The Education Watch podcast this week covers a lot of ground that pertains to early education. We talk about a forthcoming Head Start brief, news from the U.S. Department of Education on Race to the Top (including five new winners of Early Learning Challenge grants) and new commentary in Ed Week on half-day kindergarten and the mismatch with the Common Core. 

Last week on Ed Money Watch, Clare McCann reported on the new, comparable, statewide high school graduation rates released by the U.S. Department of Education. The bottom line: graduation rates are lower than previously reported, and achievement gaps are a huge challenge for states. But even though the news is grim, the fact that the data exist is a major achievement. The more accurate rates are the result of years of negotiations and efforts by governors, state education agencies, the U.S. Department of Education, and advocacy groups. It’s been no secret that previous graduation rate numbers were inflated, and often flat-out wrong. Unfortunately, though, just as states gain better graduation rate data, many are failing to use them to their full potential.

Originally, graduation rates were a component of high school accountability under No Child Left Behind (NCLB), but schools could often make Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) if they showed very little improvement. That changed in 2008 with the adoption of the 4-year adjusted cohort rate. By the 2011-2012 school year, not only would accountability judgments be made with accurate data, but states would also base high schools’ AYP determinations on “continuous and substantial” progress toward graduation rate targets for all students and for student subgroups.

So far, so good. But the 2008 Department of Education couldn’t travel in time to see that in the 2011-2012 school year, many states would be transitioning away from NCLB-style accountability and AYP altogether. With the recent addition of Pennsylvania, only four states will not apply for some sort of NCLB waiver (if you count Texas and California as submitting valid requests). In the era of federal education policy via waiver, many states have refined their accountability plans by adding individual student growth, college and career readiness, and other measures to provide a better picture of school achievement than determinations based mostly on proficiency rates.

But adding multiple measures to accountability schemes – and then condensing them into one overall grade or ranking – can introduce new problems. An aggregate grade may be simple to understand, but it also provides less information to parents and policymakers than the data for each component within the grade. And under some states’ waivers, performance on one indicator – like graduation rates – could be masked by above-average performance on another, like test scores. Finally, while many argue NCLB placed too much weight on tests, diluting the significance of existing data by adding more measures to the system sends a different signal (and perhaps a negative one) to educators and parents about what matters most.

Before, low graduation rates could trigger a school not to make AYP and, therefore, to be placed in improvement status. Now, college and career readiness factors (like SAT or ACT scores and AP exam performance) are often weighted equally with graduation rates. This may create incentives for high school administrators and educators to focus on improving college and career readiness at the expense of efforts to prevent dropouts. To be sure, college and career readiness is important. But students will never be college- and career-ready if they don’t graduate from high school. Schools must pursue both goals – higher graduation rates and higher readiness rates – at the same time, and accountability systems should reflect both.

Even more alarming, many states’ waivers are a step backward from the carefully-negotiated 2008 regulations. States are still required to report the 4-year adjusted cohort rates, but many are not using the new measure as intended for accountability in their waivers. In some cases, states are backing away from commitments to hold schools accountable for subgroup performance. Worse, others have modified the 4-year adjusted cohort rate for accountability purposes by giving schools credit for students graduating in five or six years, or with a GED. With mounting criticism from advocacy groups and key policymakers, the U.S. Department of Education recently sent states a “Dear Colleague” letter to clarify that the 2008 regulations are still in effect.

However, actions speak louder than words, and the Department has not required any state to modify its waiver plan if it undermines the intent of the 2008 regulations. They should – and there is already a model for how to do it. The Department successfully negotiated with Virginia to adopt new, more rigorous goals for minority and disadvantaged students after their initial performance targets sparked a public controversy. Without getting serious about graduation rate accountability, the 2008 regulations will remain half-baked. States will know how bad the problem is, but they won’t be creating a policy environment in which schools are motivated to fix it.

The U.S. Department of Education has released some preliminary results on the effectiveness of the School Improvement Grant (SIG) program, a $545 million annual program into which the Obama administration poured an additional $3 billion in 2009 stimulus funds to “turn around” failing schools.

This week, the U.S. Department of Education released the first comparable, statewide high school on-time graduation rates. The results from the 2010-2011 school year show more students failed to complete high school in four years than was previously thought, especially when examined by subgroup.

The Bush administration’s Department of Education mandated the new measure – the adjusted four-year cohort graduate rate – in 2008, so states reported data from their first cohort this year. This year’s rates, therefore, refer to students who were 9^th graders in 2008 and earned a high school diploma within four years, with adjustments for students who transferred in and transferred out to other high schools. Idaho, Kentucky, and Puerto Rico did not report 2011 graduation rates; they were granted extensions because their data systems are not yet sophisticated enough to accurately calculate the new graduation rate. Previously, states defined their own version of the graduation rate calculation, and many students slipped through the cracks, inflating the graduation rates.

As the data from the Department show, the now-comparable graduation rate calculation often yields far more concerning results than did previous reports. Overall, the District of Columbia had the lowest all-student graduation rate under the new formula at 59 percent, and no state topped an 88 percent graduation rate (Iowa). Alabama’s state-determined graduation rate in 2010 was 87.7 percent; its adjusted rate in 2011 was 72 percent, a nearly 16 percentage point drop for students. New Jersey’s rate fell by almost 12 points from nearly 95 percent in 2010 (using the state-defined rate) to 83 percent under the new calculation.  

In addition to providing comparable data, the 2008 regulation continued what No Child Left Behind (arguably) did best: disaggregating student performance data by subgroup. The new data also provide the first comparable graduation rates for racial and ethnic groups, as well as for special populations like English language learners and economically disadvantaged students. As with standardized test data, the new graduation rate reporting has also revealed large achievement gaps within states.

The disparities among ethnic groups are striking. In Ohio, for example, 80 percent of students overall graduated on time, compared to only 59 percent of African-American students – a 22 percentage point difference. And even in states with large Hispanic populations, like Colorado, those students had a graduation rate 14 points below the overall graduation rate of 60 percent for all students.

Moreover, other sub-populations had abysmally low graduation rates. Only a quarter of Arizona’s English language learners and only 29 percent of Louisiana’s special education students graduated on time. Low-income students were documented as graduating at lower rates in nearly every state in the country, with the exception of South Dakota. In Connecticut, the difference in graduation rates for low-income students was more than 20 percentage points.

Under the No Child Left Behind waivers issued by the U.S. Department of Education this year, states designed new accountability plans – and in some cases, that means a renewed focus on graduation rate definitions, as some states modify their graduation rate accountability requirements. But whether states choose to use a different graduation rate in their NCLB waivers or not, they will still be required to report the new adjusted cohort rate, both overall and disaggregated by subgroups, at the state, school district, and high school levels. Check back with Ed Money Watch next week for more detail on this topic.

The new graduation rate data aren’t perfect – multiple states didn’t even report this year, and we don’t have any prior-year data to evaluate trends yet – but they reflect a much more accurate take of how high school students fare. The figures states reported should serve as a warning to education stakeholders that states are not serving many of their students, and particularly some of the highest-needs students, well enough.

Release the kraken data! The U.S. Department of Education has finally revealed some of the results from its research on the effectiveness of the School Improvement Grant (SIG) program, or rather, the one-time, $3 billion infusion to the SIG program included in the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA). The controversial program, which was re-tooled by the Obama administration, has supported intensive turnaround efforts – up to $2 million per school – in over 1,300 of the nation’s chronically low-performing schools.

The sliver of data released this week includes 2009-10 and 2010-11 test data from about 730 of the 831 highest priority SIG schools, those categorized into Tier I or Tier II.[1] Here are the highlights (H/T to RiShawn Biddle and PoliticsK-12):

• Two-thirds of schools showed gains in math, and two-thirds in reading in the first year of the SIG program (2010-11)
• 25 percent of schools saw double-digit gains in math, and 15 percent in reading
• 40 percent of schools saw single-digit gains in math, and 49 percent in reading
• 28 percent of schools saw a single-digit decrease in math, and 29 percent in reading
• 6 percent of schools saw a double-digit decrease in math, and 8 percent in reading
• 26 percent of schools had posted math improvements the year prior to entering SIG, but declined once they received SIG funding; this happened for 28 percent of schools in reading
• 28 percent of schools had posted math declines the year prior to entering SIG, but improved once they received SIG funding; this happened for 25 percent of schools in reading
• A larger proportion of elementary schools posted gains in the first year of the SIG program, compared to middle and high schools, and they were less likely to see declines
• Rural schools appear to fair as well as schools in suburban and urban areas

But can we say that “there’s dramatic change happening in these schools” as Secretary Duncan claimed? Not so fast. Clearly, the Department didn’t read Matt DiCarlo’s excellent run-down of when you can – and cannot – make policy claims based on test data.

First, the Department doesn’t clarify whether any of these increases or decreases in test scores are statistically significant. Given inherent measurement error in any assessment and the fact that it is unclear if the Department is using proficiency rates (less accurate) or actual test scores (more accurate) to calculate these gains and losses, statistical significance cannot be assumed.

Second, the Department doesn’t clarify whether they are using cross-sectional or longitudinal data. In other words, were the gains or declines based on individual student growth (i.e. a student taking the 3rd grade test in math improved when taking the 4th grade math test) or were they based on comparing this year’s crop of 3rd graders in math to last year’s 3rd graders? My money is on the latter, which limits how we can interpret the data as the results aren’t fully comparable from the pre-SIG year to year one of the turnaround program.

Third, the Department doesn’t explain whether or how the researchers took into account other non-school factors that could affect student achievement. Without at least addressing these issues, it is impossible to know whether changes in student performance were even attributable to changes in school leadership or culture (i.e. the SIG program) rather than conditions in the economy or students’ home lives. And the Department doesn’t explain how they controlled for other policies at the school-level that could influence test scores. As chronically low-performing schools, the SIG interventions are unlikely to be the only improvement strategy or program at work in these schools.

These are huge caveats to the SIG data, but that’s not to say that ED’s findings aren’t important. They are. But more details are sorely needed to really make an accurate assessment of the program.

To begin with, the Department of the Education must disaggregate the data into the four turnaround models. More significantly, changes in student proficiency rates on standardized tests are only one possible outcome of the SIG program – and perhaps not the most important outcome to track. The Department plans to release student and teacher attendance data, enrollment in advanced courses, and other “leading indicators” for the SIG schools next year, but what about data relating to school leadership, school culture, and parent involvement?

While more difficult to quantify, these areas are also essential components of school turnarounds. Secretary Duncan alluded to it in releasing these early results: “What’s clear already is that almost without exception, schools moving in the right direction have two things in common; a dynamic principal with a clear vision for establishing a culture of high expectations, and talented teachers who share that vision, with a relentless commitment to improving instruction.” However, the data attached to Duncan’s statement failed to mention the effect sof leadership or teaching in SIG schools.

Predictably, analysts – notably Bellwether’s Andy Smarick – have already interpreted the early results as a failure of the entire SIG effort. But without more convincing and complete data, it really is too early to make definitive judgments about the program. This nuanced, wait-and-see approach may not be as satisfying, but in an effort as important as improving our nation’s worst schools, it is the right approach to take.

Morehouse, a private, all-male, liberal arts college, is one of the most prestigious historically black colleges in the nation. With a mission to develop men with disciplined minds who will lead lives of leadership and service, and a notable alumni list that includes Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Morehouse attracts some of the best and brightest. So why has this esteemed, selective institution of higher education suddenly been forced to furlough faculty and staff? The answer proves to be both surprising and unsettling: Parent PLUS Loans.

As I’ve written here before, Parent PLUS loans have increasingly become a burden for many families. While the federal government issues these loans, they are most similar to private loans and require parents to pay a high, fixed interest rate of 7.9 percent (plus a 4 percent origination fee, for a total APR of about 9 percent). Parents borrow these loans on behalf of their college-going children, and must meet minimal standards to qualify (more minimal than for private loans).  Unlike federal Stafford or Perkins loans, there is no cap on PLUS loans. Parents may borrow up to the full “Cost of Attendance” (COA) of the institution.

Here’s the problem: Morehouse is expensive. Its COA for 2011-2012 was around $44,000. Even when taking into account federal, state, and institutional financial aid, its average net price was $23,324. For students from families with incomes at or below $30,000, the net price was $23,036. Think about that. Some families are paying more than what they make in one year to send their children to Morehouse.  And Morehouse attracts a significant percentage of low-income students—almost 50 percent receive Pell Grants.

In 2009, President Obama and a Democratic Congress passed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), an economic stimulus package that included large, one-time cash infusions for some of the federal government’s largest education programs.  But since then, Congress and the president reset funding for key PreK-12 programs back to their prior funding levels and haven’t increased it since. Meanwhile, they’ve ensured that the Pell Grant program for undergraduate students from low-income families maintained the one-time funding gains and then some. Will a second-term Obama administration continue this Pell-at-the-expense-of-everything-else policy?  First, let’s review how policymakers got here.

Under the stimulus bill, Title I funding for disadvantaged PreK-12 students grew by $10 billion.  Special education state grants under Part B of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) nearly doubled, with an extra $11.3 billion, in addition to the program’s regular 2009 appropriation of $11.5 billion. And the Pell Grant program for low-income college students got a $15.6 billion add-on to its 2009 appropriation of $17.3 billion.

Since then, lawmakers have boosted the U.S. Department of Education’s budget overall by a healthy sum (especially when compared with other agencies), up from $59.2 billion in fiscal year 2008 to $68.1 billion in 2012. Amidst that healthy increase, however, lawmakers kept Title I funding and IDEA funding essentially flat.

What explains the overall funding increase? A big part of it went to Pell Grants. But there is more to the explanation. After the stimulus money had run out for other education programs, lawmakers approved four additional years of emergency supplemental funding for Pell Grants, which coincided with a separate increase to an entitlement funding stream for the program that started in 2008. The result may be the largest funding increase for any federal education program in history—while other programs remained flat.

Here’s the kicker: That emergency supplemental funding lawmakers approved for Pell Grants will run out this year. So the program needs another infusion of funding of about $5.8 billion, according to the Congressional Budget Office, just to keep it going in its current form. The following year that figure jumps to $8.7 billion. Over the next 10 years, the total gap is $76.5 billion.

Over the coming weeks and months, it’s time for lawmakers to starting thinking about smart ways to reform the Pell Grant program and put it on a sustainable funding path—but also to ensure that the program serves low-income college students well. PreK-12 programs have a lot riding on that outcome.

What might President Barack Obama’s second term mean for education? In short: four more years. Education Secretary Arne Duncan—a member of Obama’s Chicago circle, with whom the president played basketball on Election Day—has indicated he would like to stay in his job, and Obama’s campaign trumpeting of education policies such as Race to the Top show the administration’s aggressive approach to competitive grant programs, meant to cajole states and districts into embracing favored reform strategies, will likely continue.

Early learning advocates will be pleased programs such as Head Start are less likely to be severely cut with a Democratic Senate and White House to help safeguard them. And the Department of Health and Human Services and the Department of Education now have the chance to continue to forge needed links between their agencies. But those who thought Obama’s early education policies were “too little too late” might remain disappointed. The president made almost no effort to outline a plan for early learning during this campaign, especially compared to the promises of 2008, and has not specifically indicated what he proposes to do for the youngest learners. That said, there are murmurs from Obama insiders that a broad-spectrum approach to early childhood education, including the often-forgotten early grades (K-3) of elementary school, could emerge as a theme in the second term. A Tuesday night press release from the nation’s largest teachers’ union, the National Education Association, hinted at a desire to hold the president accountable for making headway on early childhood investments. “Throughout the campaign,” the statement said, “the president pledged to invest in education—especially in early childhood education—and to make higher education more affordable.” 

Last week the National Journal Education Experts blog asked about Secretary of Education Arne Duncan’s first term legacy.

In my response, I highlight Duncan’s work to set the stage for improving early learning from birth through 3rd grade. I also suggest priorities for Duncan should he get the opportunity for a second term:

The Obama administration announced today that its redesigned Income-Based Repayment (IBR) regulations for federal student loans are now final. The plan, called Pay-As-You-Earn, is meant to help struggling borrowers repay their loans, but according to the Federal Education Budget Project report, Safety Net or Windfall? Examining Changes to Income-Based Repayment for Federal Student Loans, it also will provide substantial benefits to borrowers earning high incomes.

Ed Money Watch has published several posts detailing that finding and recommending changes to the policy that would prevent high-income earners from receiving a windfall while preserving the safety-net function of IBR for struggling borrowers. Nevertheless, the regulations that the U.S. Department of Education finalized today make no attempt to address this issue.

To better illustrate exactly how IBR will now provide significant benefits to higher income earners, below is a narrated micro-simulation for one hypothetical borrower.

It explains how different repayment plans affect the borrower, including:

• the original IBR repayment plan (“Old IBR”), signed into law in 2007, which caps a borrower’s monthly payments at 15 percent of his income minus cost-of-living exemption, and forgives all outstanding debt after 25 years;
• the consolidation plan that allows borrowers to pay over extended terms to reduce their monthly payments but requires that they fully repay their loans;
• and the “New IBR,” the plan that the Obama administration finalized today, which limits a borrower’s monthly payments to 10 percent of his income minus a cost-of-living exemption and forgives unpaid debt after 20 years of payments.

The narrative and accompanying table demonstrate that a hypothetical borrower – in this case a law school graduate earning more than $160,000 20 years into his career – will reap a massive windfall under the New IBR compared with the Old IBR. And it is obvious from his very first payment that New IBR delivers a very large subsidy compared to any other repayment plan available to him. As is shown below, the borrower in this example faces no downside or financial risk in maxing out his federal student loans and repaying through the New IBR while earning a six-figure income for much of his repayment term.

Robert’s Law School Loans: Old IBR

Robert’s Law School Loans: New IBR